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Part V 
A Theory of the Ontology of Love 
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Chapter 14 
Transparency and Ontology of Love 
In his book The Path of Perfect Love, Diogenes Allen suggests that it is because of our 
inability to perceive the reality of other people and things that we don’t grasp what brings out the 
fundamental feature of love, viz. the recognition or perception of things beside one’s self. The 
reader may recall that both Badhwar and Royce made reference, the latter extensively, to the 
importance of recognizing the reality of the other person if one is to love. Allen focuses deeply 
on this theme. I will briefly present Allen’s position in section I and turn to a sermon given by 
Meister Eckhart in section II. These reflections allow us to pursue, in section III, the notion of 
transparency. Section IV summarizes the various things we have learned along the way, putting 
them into the broader context of transparency. Section V proposes an account of the human 
individual that links the individual through transparency to the community. Providing an 
ontology of the heavenly individual in turn provides for the ontology of love for, as it turns out, 
love is an enduring component of the individual properly understood.  
I 
 Diogenes Allen quotes from Iris Murdock’s novel The Unicorn, in which the character 
Effingham Cooper falls into a bog and nearly dies.  Allen says in response that “Even though she 
[Murdock] also says that it is through death, or the immanence of one’s own death, that the 
perception of others as realities sometimes occurs, Effingham still does exist and he is conscious, 
since he is aware of other things. He is not, however, self-conscious. He is so full of the presence 
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and reality of something else that his own presence is longer part of his awareness. . . .”1 Allen 
continues by noting that this is the death of the self as the one reality, the center of everything else. 
It is a shift from seeing oneself as being only in relationship to one’s self, to entering relationship 
with others. “One has only to cease to exert one’s power to be a center to accept them fully as 
independent realities, to live ‘in the light’.”2 
As we’ve seen at various places in the text above, self-interest is central to our notion of 
the individual self. However, self-interest can’t exist without self-consciousness. Without self-
consciousness, even if in the fleeting sense that happens for Murdock’s Effingham, we find 
ourselves aware only of the reality of the things and people around us. In an interesting description 
that summarizes his view, Allen writes: 
We have . . . the power to occupy a position that is a type of solipsism. That is, when we 
have a unique concern for ourselves, we see things from our own point of view with our 
selves as the center, and estimate the value and significance of all things in terms of their 
worth for us. Their value is conditional; our own is not. We are an end, and nothing else is 
perceived or regarded that way. Ontologically we are primary, since our concern is for 
ourselves and for other things only as they relate to us, and we are ontologically unique. 
We have no way of entering into the experience of other people, or animals, or plants, and 
we have no regard for nonliving things as existing independently of their relation to us and 
                                                 
1 Diogenes Allen, The Path of Perfect Love, revised edition, Cambridge, MA: Cowley 
Publications, 1992, 13. 
2 Allen, 14.  
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their value or significance to us. We can truly say that there are other minds, other centers 
of feeling, and things exist independently of us, yet at the same time be experiential 
solipsists.3 
Several observations are in order.  
First, not only do we have the power to occupy this position of experiential solipsism but 
it is our typical, fallen view, rooted in our local self-interest. The question is whether we can 
occupy the alternate position in which we truly view and understand other people and the rest of 
the natural order as real in its own right. A second question is whether knowing the reality of the 
other is enough to provide for love. So far forth, Allen seems to provide us with a step in the 
right direction, viz. that others are real and of value in their own right and not merely in 
relationship to me. But it seems that he leaves open the possibility—in fact, the very pragmatic 
issue—of how knowing others are real enables me to love the other in the strong love provided 
for in the doctrine of the communion of the saints. There will, it seems, be conflicts between 
what I value and what the other values. Of course, in the heavenly realm all our needs are met 
and so those conflicts disappear. Our local self-interests understood in their own way will cease 
to play the important role that they do now. But then we need an explanation of what the 
ontology of the individual human is in the communion.   
Allen proposes that there are two kinds of selves, the egocentric and the moral. To be an 
egocentric person “is to have a unique self-regard, and thereby to judge all things only as they 
                                                 
3 Allen, 19. 
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relate to oneself.”4 In this state, “we do not actually experience ourselves as merely one among 
others, one item among many. We do not experience or possess ontological humility.”5 The 
moral person, in contrast, is “one who is aware of being one reality among other realities. It is 
not at all clear to me that anyone is able to occupy that position of perceiving the reality of others 
for very long or very often.”6 He continues, “Nonetheless, we can be aware of the idea, at least, 
of what a moral person is and at times become aware in a small way of what a saintly person 
[is].”7 As we move toward being a moral person, we first lose our sense of value but then gain it 
back as we truly come to understand our own reality, a reality not filtered through our own 
narcissistic love but rather the reality as perceived by others. “To become aware of my true 
worth, I must be occupied fully by them (and they by me), and see myself only in my effect on 
them.”8 We need, in short, ontological humility.  
Finally, Allen calls attention to Plato’s discussion of the myth about love as a search for 
our other halves. Once, goes the myth, a person had two heads, four arms, four legs, etc. and then 
everyone was split down the middle. Thus, each of us spends our time looking for our lost half. 
Socrates’s response to the myth suggests that although love begins with particulars, ultimately we 
                                                 
4 Allen, 20. 
5 Allen, 20. 
6 Allen, 20. 
7 Allen, 21. 
8 Allen, 23.  
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seek the forms of love, beauty, and justice. We move from the particulars that are the beginning 
point of calling us into love via beauty to loving the forms. Allen responds: 
In the last resort, Plato’s scheme denigrates these particulars. They are valuable only 
because of the presence of something else; their own particularity is not primary. But to 
love is to perceive particulars as irreducible realities that are not to be put into orbit around 
oneself, nor to be made an example of something else, a specimen of a universal. For then 
it is the universal that is the real thing, and the particular is real only in so far as it 
participates in it. What we are to love is a particular, a center, full of unrealistic worth but 
also true worth that is not exhausted or captured by whatever likeness it has to others.9 
Although I think Allen is correct when he notes that love is about particulars, it is also about the 
universally valuable realities that we all have interest in. We have an interest in them, however, 
not as particulars of the local self-interested sort but as newly formed particulars-in-communion. 
II 
One way to solve the problems of solidarity and motivation considers the theme of 
knowledge. A clue is found in one of Meister Eckhart’s sermons. He writes:  
The whole Being of God is contained in God alone. The whole of humanity is not 
contained in one person, for one person is not all people. But in God the soul knows all 
humanity, and all things at their highest level of existence, since it knows them in their 
essence. Suppose any one to be in a beautifully adorned house: that person would know 
                                                 
9 Allen, 38. 
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much more about it than one who had never entered therein, and yet wished to speak 
much about it.10 
The context for this quotation is a discussion of the nearness of God. Eckhart says: “God is 
nearer to me than I am to myself; my existence depends on the nearness and presence of God. He 
is also near things of wood and stone, but they know it not. If a piece of wood became as aware 
of the nearness of God as an archangel is, the piece of wood would be as happy as an archangel.” 
He continues on, “Our happiness does not arise from this, that God is near us, and in us, and that 
he possesses God; but from this, that we know the nearness of God, and love Him, and are aware 
that “the Kingdom of God is near.” Further, “God is equally near all creatures.” 11  
Eckhart apparently thinks that true happiness (both on earth and in heaven) is due to our 
awareness of the nearness of God. But he also thinks that in knowing God, we know all of 
humanity. If we are in the beautiful house, we know much more about it. So it is with God. If we 
are in God, we know not only God, but everything in God, including all the saints. However, we 
cannot know God unless we deny ourselves. Indeed, we cannot know even ourselves unless we 
deny ourselves. Eckhart writes:  
For, if one creature be set over against another, it may appear to be beautiful . . . , but if it 
be set over against God it is nothing. I say moreover: If the soul is to know God it must 
forget itself and lose itself, for as long as it contemplates self, it cannot contemplate God. 
                                                 
10 Meister Eckhart, “The Nearness of the Kingdom,” 
http://www.ccel.org/e/eckhart/sermons/htm/v.htm 
11 Ibid. 
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When it has lost itself and everything in God, if finds itself again in God when it attains 
to the knowledge of Him, and it finds also everything which it abandoned complete in 
God. If I am to know the highest good, and the everlasting Godhead, truly I must know 
them as they are in themselves apart from creation. If I am to know real existence, I must 
know it as it is in itself, not as it is parceled out in creatures.12 
It is natural to suggest that in order to see the beauty that is our (true) selves, we must compare 
ourselves to God. If we do that, we’ll see that we have no true beauty of our own, but we do have 
God’s beauty. Here we should call attention to the fact that Eckert need not be saying that the 
beauty we have as individuals is not real. Rather he is saying that the beauty is not ours; that is, 
we did not make it, it derives from another.  
Because the truth about ourselves is that our beauty derives from another, what we could 
not know as creatures interested in ourselves, we can know as creatures who have denied self, 
thereby arriving in the beatitude of heaven. We then gain ourselves back as we really, essentially 
are, along with a perfect knowledge of everything else, in its own nature. The question is, what 
is it that we essentially are? 
In order to obtain what is ultimately good for oneself—true knowledge of one’s self—
one must deny oneself. One way to think of this is to suggest that human (local) self-interest is 
contrary to God’s interest. God’s interest is in the good, which, presumably, includes the good 
for us. But because of the fall of humanity away from God’s intentions for us, our own self-
interest is skewed. Our self-interest is not “on the mark.” So we must set our (fallen) self-interest 
                                                 
12 Ibid. 
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aside in order to let God bring out our true interest. In order for us to get where we will 
genuinely and truly be happy, we must let God provide for us what we truly need. We truly need 
to understand ourselves and to do that we must let God grant us that understanding. In due course 
then, we must stop trying to figure it out on our own, and let God show us how we truly are 
and/or were meant to be. So even though the saints in heaven have denied themselves, they also 
gain their true selves back. Are, then, the saints in heaven self-interested?  
That depends on what is meant by self-interest. If the saints are anything, it seems they 
are people who are so God-centered that they would always set aside their interest for God’s 
interest should there be a conflict between the two. Yet as I’ve suggested, there would never be 
such a conflict. Since all the saints’ needs have been met, and the saints are so pure so as to have 
no greed beyond their needs, it seems there would, in fact, never be an actual conflict. Our needs 
in heaven are met not because God does something there that God doesn’t do on earth but rather 
that our nature as saints becomes truly and finally clear to us. The saints see themselves “in their 
essence.” What is that essence? It is a total reliance on God and, indeed, a complete knowledge 
of that total reliance. It won’t do to be totally reliant; one must know and acknowledge that total 
reliance. In addition, since God’s interest is only in the good, the true, and the beautiful, and 
human interest in heaven is aligned with God’s interest, both will share the same interest in the 
good, the true, and the beautiful. We might say that the human will becomes amalgamated with 
God’s will.13 Thus, the interest of the saints and the interests of God are identical.  
                                                 
13 For an extended analysis of this sort of amalgamation, see my Repairing Eden, Montreal: 
McGill-Queens University Press, 2005.  
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But is God self-interested? I earlier argued for a negative answer to that question. I 
proposed that in the Christian tradition, goodness is fundamentally a social issue. There can be 
no true good unless that good is shared. To desire a good thing is never to desire something only 
for oneself. Individuals are, in the end, always individuals-in-community. Of course, something 
good can also be good for oneself but to bring about the good (even for oneself) is to bring about 
the good for others. Rather than the problem being how is it possible to act solely for the good of 
another (as the problem of altruism has it) the question is how is it possible to act solely for the 
good of oneself. This insight unfolds from the doctrine of the Trinity. God, by very nature, is a 
socially interconnected unity of three persons who share one essence. An act done by one person 
is done, in effect, by all three and for all three. Eckert brings this insight into focus by arguing 
that while humans appear not to be connected in this way, in fact, they are. Humans can, in fact, 
act like God, always in unity with others. But to do so, we must get to the point of knowing what 
we truly are and this, says Eckert, we can only do by denying out selves and thus recognizing our 
true nature.  
Insofar as the heavenly saints share God’s will we might surmise that the saints would 
have the self-same intention for helping the earthly and purifying saints as God does. The 
motivation is, thus, out of goodness itself, which would seem to move us out of the realm of self-
interest and away from the Golden Rule as it is applied strictly on the basis of need. God has no 
needs, no weaknesses, and is entirely self-sufficient. So God has no need-based self-interest, no 
local self-interest. God has only share-interest. What falls within God’s range of “self-interest” is 
really only interest in the good, the true, and the beautiful which are, by their very natures, 
objects of share-interest.  
11 
 
It is central to see, however, that God’s interest, and by extension, human interest, is not 
in merely abstract goodness, beauty, and truth. It is particulars, as Allen notes, that we love. But 
particulars in the kingdom are not loved alone. To truly love a beautiful painting, we must love it 
together in community. What we make in heaven is not made for us alone but as gift to God and 
the communion. Our desires, aimed as they are at vague particulars, are desires for instantiated 
universals, the universals of goodness, truth, and beauty.  
Insofar then, as the saints in heaven have the mind of God, they will act well toward all, 
just as God does. That is the true nature of humans. As we’ve seen from Eckhart, although 
humans may attain heaven by denying themselves, the saints in heaven “get themselves back.” 
We might surmise, then, that while the saints in heaven have no further needs, they still have 
self-interest in the good for themselves in the same manner as God. So perhaps the motivation 
challenge is answered by understanding that the goods desired by the saints in heaven are 
identical those “desired” by God, viz., goodness itself (that is, God). However, it must be an 
interest shaped by God’s interest in goodness for its own sake.  
What, exactly, is the nature of God’s interest? Of course, we don’t know this 
experientially (except for perhaps a few mystics/saints). Yet we can make some surmises. First, 
human self-interest seems problematic in some regards vis-à-vis ethics. That is, the interests of 
two people with exactly the same self-interest might tend to cancel each other out, should the 
resources for meeting those two self-interests be limited. If divine interest is only in goodness 
itself, God’s interest will never—in fact cannot—conflict with some other interest. There is 
never a lack of resource to fulfill the needs and desires of everyone—never a lack of materials to 
move the universal through some vague particular to an admired-for-its-own-sake specific 
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particular—when those desires are appropriate. Second, when we think of the virtues, we think 
of what is good for us as human creatures, that is, what is in our interest as humans. When it 
comes to God, however, virtue talk may be quite out of place. God may have no virtues because 
rather than being good in some derivative sense, God simply is goodness itself. If a human is 
good, she is good comparatively and derivatively. God simply is good. The divine is the standard 
of goodness and cannot be compared to itself, rather like the standard meter cannot be compared 
to itself and pronounced a meter in length.  
Yet the challenge seems to remain, for humans are not God. God’s interest just is interest 
in the divine being qua good and presumably everything that flows out of God’s good being, 
including creation. Humans fall short of God, for even though a human person could take on 
God’s interest in the good, humans themselves do not become goodness itself, even in heaven. 
But perhaps Eckhart’s solution provides a framework for thinking about human relatedness to 
pure goodness.  
Eckert’s approach is to link our happiness to knowledge, and knowledge, of course, links 
to truth. What is important to see is that the truth about the universe must itself be good if 
Eckert’s approach is to work.14 The truth about the universe is something that, as we come to 
know it, supports our happiness. On Eckert’s account, the truth about ourselves is known only by 
denying ourselves so we can know God. In knowing God, however, we come to know not only 
                                                 
14 Here see my “Relaxed Naturalism and Caring About the Truth,” Forum Philosophicum, 
Spring 2012 for a discussion of why naturalism cannot support a link between truth and 
happiness whereas a Christian or theistic position can.  
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ourselves again but the truth about others for that truth is contained in God. Typically we know 
neither ourselves nor others. Arguably, that is because we think of ourselves as rooted in local 
self-interest where the means of control over our futures is, indeed, ourselves. Once we deny 
ourselves, however, we can gain access to God—we can be “in God”—and hence we become 
aware of the other in a deeper, fuller way, as Eckert indicates. Here Paul’s teaching that in 
heaven we shall know as we are known comes into play. We become, in effect, totally 
transparent to one another. However, thus far we have only Eckert’s word for the claim that such 
transparency will lead to happiness. He doesn’t explain what our true natures are, short of 
announcing that humans are totally dependent on God even for their goodness and beauty. 
However, Eckert’s pointing toward transparency as a means of teaching us who we really are 
gives us some further building blocks. 
III 
Love, St. Paul tells us never ends. When love fully comes into play, I will know even as I 
am fully known. I mentioned in chapter 2 that to know as I am known is a new sort of 
knowledge, since Paul tells us knowledge will pass away. What sort of knowledge is this 
knowledge of the other? It at once expresses a deep human desire and a curiosity. Presumably, I 
have been fully known by God. But that I will fully know in the same way as I’ve been known is 
a new, richer, deeper sort of knowledge. It appears that the saints will know each other (and 
God?) as God fully knows us. The unity and plurality of I Corinthians chapter 12 is apparently 
retained and a new sort of knowledge added.  
It is easy to let this language flourish as metaphor, as an attractive picture of that for 
which we long. But we need to push beyond the metaphor to get to a fuller philosophical 
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understanding. One way to think of this knowledge is to consider the notion of transparency from 
game theory. Game theory is the study of strategic decision making. How do members of a group 
work or fail to work together to reach some joint goal? Often applied to economic settings, it also 
has application to biology, philosophy and psychology. The notion of transparency leads to some 
interesting questions.  
Game theory suggests that transparency is a necessary requirement to find the way to the 
best agreement. All parties must make their interests clear to all stakeholders and, at the same 
time, understand and calculate the other parties’ interests and moves. Such transparency can only 
be achieved with perfect and symmetric information. In limited contexts, one can quickly see the 
value of transparency in reaching mutually satisfying agreements. But what if transparency is not 
merely limited to certain aspects of a situation—say trying to reach agreement about how to 
divide some property—but to the entirety of a person?  
Hilary Putnam writes the following, speaking of individual humans: 
Suppose our functional organization became transparent to us. Suppose we had a theory 
of it, and we could actually use this theory in a significant class of cases. What would 
happen to us? . . . Would it be possible to have friendships or hostilities? Would it be 
possible to even think of oneself as a person? I don’t know the answer to these questions, 
but it seems clear that the development of that sort of knowledge of ourselves and each 
other would modify our natures in ways that we cannot predict at all. Every institution we 
now have: art, politics, religion—even science—would be changed beyond our 
recognition. But a fact, however ‘empirical’, which underlies our entire history and which 
influences the character of every one of our institutions is not ‘mere’. The fact that we are 
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partially opaque to ourselves, in the sense of not having the ability to understand one 
another as we understand hydrogen atoms, is such a fact, a constitutive fact.15 
I want to reflect on the question that Putnam’s observation raises, viz. is it true that partial 
opacity about one another is a constitutive fact? That is, would we be what we are if we became 
transparent?  
Putnam observes, first, that our opacity influences the character of every institution we 
have. Second, he calls non-transparency an “empirical” fact (although he puts the “empirical” in 
scare quotes). These two observations go hand in hand. Our historical natures are, indeed, rooted 
in institutions and institutions are rooted in us. We humans are not separable from our 
institutions and those institutions are historical, as are we. Yet our institutions and our very 
beings are historical.  
What does it mean to say we are historical? Here I return to the developments laid out in 
Part II. Interpretation one is that we just happen to be contingent, space-time beings. We didn’t 
have to be, yet we are. This is true of every physical, created entity in the universe. To be 
contingent is to be historical. This is a more or less trivial truth about us, making us in no way 
unique among the entities in the created universe. It is, in short, an objective feature of every 
entity in the created order that has a history. 
Interpretation one says that, as a matter of fact, the world and its furniture is contingent 
and we humans happen to be some of the furniture. That is, there is nothing distinctively 
essential to our humanity in our historicity. Saying humans are historical in this sense is rather 
                                                 
15 Hilary Putnam, Meaning and the Moral Sciences London 1978, 63 
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like saying we are contingent things. That hardly picks us out among the myriad of other 
contingent things. 
Interpretation two of our historicity, however, suggests that there is something special (although 
perhaps not unique in the universe or even the planet) about us as humans, viz., that not only do 
we have an “objective” set of historical facts about us, but also that we are or can be aware of our 
historicity. To be human is to be historical interpreters. This awareness suggests that we make 
history both in our actions and in our thinking about our actions. We care, for example, about 
truth. To care about truth is itself a historical development in our evolution. One of the features 
of this sort of historicity, however, is that we are opaque to one another. We cannot, in fact, 
understand one another as we understand hydrogen atoms. Hydrogen atoms are what they are 
“objectively.” They are not, in the sense in which we are, in history. Hydrogen atoms cannot 
make choices. They can do nothing to make themselves opaque. We, however, can make choices 
and we can make ourselves—and have made ourselves—opaque.  
It is worth reflecting on why Putnam puts the “empirical” into scare quotes. He is, 
perhaps, struggling with how far and in what way our historicity causes us to be what we are. An 
empirical fact, he says, that underlies our entire history and all our institutions is not a “mere” 
fact. Is the opacity which may seem to be historically contingent truly contingent? Or is it 
constitutive? If we take “constitutive” to mean “essential,” Putnam is wondering if being human 
requires opacity something in the way that being human requires rationality or emotional 
capacity or sociality. Yet unlike those features of humans which, let’s assume, are essential to 
being human, it appears that opacity could have been different. One could be reasonable, social, 
and emotional without being opaque. Indeed, being reasonable—suggests game theory—requires 
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us to be transparent, and one can do that only by being social and understanding one’s emotions, 
in particular how one’s emotions may color the expression of the truth.  
Yet it is hard, as Putnam rightly notes, to see whether it is even possible to think of 
oneself as a person if one is not opaque. The mere “empirical” fact seems to be more than 
empirical in an accidental sense. It seems to be built into the notion of being human, much in the 
way that rationality, emotional capacity and sociality are. If we as a species lost any of those 
essential features we would cease to be human. Is the same true with our opacity? Or is the 
historical, empirical nature of opacity “merely empirical”? Could it be lost without our ceasing to 
be human? 
Is opacity a constitutive fact? The thicket is thick. If we think of opacity as parallel to sin, 
we can see that we have the same sort of issue. “Being a sinner” is constitutive of humans in the 
way described in chapters 4-7. Theologically, humanity is fallen. But yet sin is not an essential 
feature of humans. Humans were made initially without sin and, indeed, our final state is sinless. 
So far forth, just as sin is itself not a necessary feature of humanity (otherwise Jesus the human, 
or indeed any of the saints, could not be without sin), neither need opacity be. Both sin and 
opacity are constitutive for humans, but they are constitutive for humans as fallen. But that is 
rather like saying having two ears is constitutive for humans but it is constitutive for humans as 
double-eared humans. It’s true, but not that helpful.  
I propose that opacity is itself either a significant aspect of sin or perhaps even the root of 
sin itself. To be fallen is, we might say, to be opaque. Such a claim explains why we both long to 
be known and yet fear it. Here I’m reminded of the projects of Humanity+ whose general goal is 
to take humanity (via technology, in part) to the next level; to make humans everything we can 
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be.16 The trans-human movement wants to take us beyond our current limitations. Its critics, 
however, fear that if we lose our ability to fight we will lose our ability to defend ourselves; if we 
lose our ability to be jealous, we will lose our ability to love. While on the one hand our opacity 
keeps us “protected” from the enemy and makes us capable of developing friendships (at least in 
the pattern we are used to), transparency would make us open to our enemies and friendships 
would be of a totally different kind (e,g,, we would not be discovering new things about our 
“friends.”) 
Putnam seems right that the development of transparency about ourselves and each other 
would modify our natures in ways that we make it difficult to predict. But I think he is wrong 
when he says we cannot predict at all. Surely we can say something true. Would we be able to 
have hostilities, friends or even be able to describe ourselves as persons? Hostilities? No, but 
isn’t that part of the point? If winning a permanent cessation of hostilities where possible, and 
not merely a temporary one, why would that undermine our humanity? Unless one counts 
engaging in hostilities a good thing, surely overcoming them is something one wants. That is, in 
part, exactly the picture of the peaceable kingdom.  
Friendships? That is perhaps more difficult, for part of friendship seems to include the 
joy of being able to share one’s ideas, disappointments, triumphs, and losses with a friend, 
someone you totally trust. Here, however, perhaps we’ll simply need to think more broadly. 
There will be, in heaven, no disappointments or losses, although there might be triumphs (over 
new challenges) or creative ideas. Humans in heaven will not be static. We will be growing and 
                                                 
16 See their website http://humanityplus.org/ 
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creative. So although we will be transparent, there will always be new information to be shared. 
Perhaps our friendships will be surprising in the sense that others, in their creativity, will 
contribute significantly to our individuality. Friendship will also be a much wider notion, one 
presumes, for we will be friends with everyone. 
Will we be able to describe ourselves as persons? Well, certainly not as fallen persons. 
We will be redeemed persons. I call attention to two points. The first is that God, being three 
persons, is a model here. The three persons of the Trinity are no less persons for being totally 
transparent to one another. If the three members of the Trinity can be persons (might we describe 
them as friends too?), then surely transparent humans could be as well. That point, at least, goes 
to the possibility of transparent personhood (and friendship). Second, I return to a point already 
hinted at, viz., that we human persons are complex and somewhat contradictory. On the one 
hand, we withdraw from the idea that someone else would know our every thought, motivation, 
emotion and so forth. We don’t want others to know what we think of them. At least 
sometimes—when we are angry, sometimes that is exactly what we do want, but that becomes a 
way of controlling others. We don’t want others to know our motivations, for sometimes they are 
quite sordid. Our emotions too, should sometimes be hidden, we think, for good reason. No point 
in letting those around us know how depressed we truly are, as they will only try to cheer us up 
or, worse yet, try to save us.  
Yet we long to be known. We want someone to understand our point of view, to 
understand that that other person hurt us, we want help with our sordid motivations, and we want 
to feel loved by someone who understands how dark it can be in our depressive hours. Being 
known, indeed, is a way of redemption. This reflects at least one image of what a 
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psychologically and emotionally healthy person is. She is one who knows herself, is able to talk 
about her own weaknesses and strengths without undue embarrassment or shame, one who has 
solid, stable and safe personal relationships with others, at least some of which are deeply 
intimate, and one who sees others as equally valuable even with their faults. 
Yet we are afraid. We are afraid of judgment, of condemnation, or lack of compassion. 
We often don’t trust others around us and, indeed, often those others are not trustworthy. People 
can be judgmental, condemning, and lacking in compassion. Over against our human peers, for 
the Christian, God fulfills this desire to be known. God may judge, yet with grace; God may 
condemn, yet with mercy; and God never lacks compassion, the sort of compassion that brings 
healing and wholeness to our needy lives. That, it seems, is what our longing for transparency is 
all about.  
Yet the fear of transparency is alive as well. It is parallel to what some critics of the trans-
humanity movement say, viz., that the movement to human longevity and improvement makes 
too many assumptions about the human capacity to truly care and love others and that the 
movement’s assumptions are naïve. Humans have a deep propensity toward evil, harm, violence, 
and control. But that is precisely what the role of God is in the Christian story. God, not being a 
fallen human, is not prone to evil, harm, violence, or control. God is love and so can humans 
become once freed for the shackles of sin. To be free of sin, however, is not merely a negative 
position—we lack sin. Rather, it is a positive position—to be made love. In a world where 
everyone truly loved, the fears of transparency would disappear. To love is to be trustworthy.  
IV 
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The problems of heavenly motivation and solidarity hinge on the notion of the human 
individual. Human individuality, as I’ve thought of it here, depends deeply on the history of 
one’s self-in-the-world, that is, on one’s local experience full of needs, desires, and shortages of 
goods to meet those needs and desires. What appears to be in my self-interest may conflict with 
your self-interest because there simply aren’t enough goods to go around. Furthermore, who I am 
as an individual seems nearly completely wrapped up in viewing myself as responsible for 
getting myself through life. Of course, I can also take responsibility for someone else as well, as 
we do for our children and larger families—children because they can’t do for themselves and 
others when they can’t. Taking responsibility for others, however, is something that is good, we 
would typically say, only when the other person isn’t able to take responsibility for herself. We 
come back around to the notion that the individual is, somehow, a self-contained, autonomous 
individual. 
I suggested earlier that morality is quite distinct from love, the latter being an alternative 
way of life quite different from one based on the requirements of duty. Mavrodes suggests that 
gift giving and sharing are the building blocks of the economy of love. Morality is a shadow of 
the real world of love, a fact reflected in the struggles we have in sorting out the pragmatic from 
the moral. Our world is arranged around the notion that people are individual selves, autonomous 
beings who are responsible for themselves first and others second, at least when we take 
ourselves from a pragmatic point of view. That conflicts, of course, with the fact that morally we 
see conflicts between our duties to others and our own self-interest. Self-interest is “locally 
owned and operated.” It finds it difficult to recognize that the very same grounds I have for 
acting well to myself are found in each of us. My suggestion that we view the conflict of  
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obligations to others and self-interest as a moral conflict and not a pragmatic/moral conflict 
pushes us to face the conflicting obligations we have between ourselves and others. Hence arises 
the question of altruism in which we leave the realm of duty behind. Having seen no good reason 
(morally) to choose myself over the other, the only question is, will I be altruistic or not. 
Morally, it simply doesn’t matter.  
That returns us to self-interest vs. share-interest. One can be share-interested in 
something (such as beauty, truth or goodness). Share-interests are a marker of what it means to 
be human. Share-interest does not involve self-interest at least of the sort that desires something 
only for oneself. Indeed, I think the notion of acting for oneself cannot, ultimately, be made 
sense of, for all actions are actions for others if we acknowledge our true nature as human 
persons. In considering beauty, I suggested that there is nothing about the interest in beauty that 
is unique to me; there is no merely local self-interest in beauty. If we generalize from beauty to 
the other things in heaven—the good and the true—then insofar as one’s individual identity 
depends on local self-interest, the economy of love seems not to require the individual qua 
individual, at least as we typically think of the individual, viz., individuals who are what they are 
because of their local self-interest. One seems not particularly concerned about one’s own 
reception of goods other than to taste and see that they are good before passing them on. The 
desire to “taste and see that it is good” is, in reality, not distinguishable from the desire for one’s 
neighbor’s good. To see that, however, one needs an account of the individual that is not based 
entirely on local self-interest.  
I suggested as well that gift-giving and sacrifice to meet the needs of others is not 
required in heaven for there are no unmet needs. Hence sacrificing and gift-giving (insofar as the 
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latter leans on the former) seem to be, as Mavrodes uses them, metaphors for the kingdom rather 
than literal truths. However, when it comes to desire, sacrifice and gift-giving may not be so 
metaphorical. Sacrifice, in particular the self-sacrifice required by Christian holiness, appears 
necessary in order to make it to the kingdom. One must die to one’s self, that is, to one’s self as 
we see ourselves in the local self-interest account. But dead people are dead; they are no longer 
people, at least in any way we might consider usual. I think that if we unpack the metaphor of 
dying to one’s self, we get the following. First, dying to one’s self is something I must choose to 
do. That is, I must strive to overcome the sense of myself as more important than other selves. 
That is Royce’s moral insight. But as Royce notes, it’s one thing to have the cool, clear rational 
insight and another to sustain it. To do that, dying to one’s self requires an effort of the self to 
come to see itself as not self-reliant. Here the point isn’t merely that we are weak and in need, at 
least sometimes, of aid. Rather it is that we must see ourselves as not made or created by 
ourselves.  
In the first order, our reliance is, of course, on God. God made us in the divine image, as 
free, creative beings. But in our creative freedom, we denied our reliance. Theologically, this is 
the source of the fall. We have been living as if we make ourselves. Here we need to distinguish 
between two things, the merely factual nature of our beings and the creative freedom that comes 
with the package. While of course we know we didn’t cause ourselves to be (even the most 
ardent atheist will admit that), once in existence, we can choose in large measure our future 
paths. That is, we are contingent and didn’t have to be but we are brought about by forces 
beyond our control. Our physical, chemical, and biological structures are given us. But what we 
do with those structures is up to us (barring outside forces again—the rain falls on the just and 
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the unjust). The problem, from the point of view of this work, is not that we don’t recognize our 
contingency. It is, rather, that we believe we ought to pursue our own futures from the point of 
view of self-interest.  
Our choices, of course, do create our futures in significant ways. That is that nature of 
freedom. What we fail to realize, however, is that we were meant to “live and move and have our 
being” in God. The self was never meant to be autonomous in the way we think of it. Our sense 
of autonomy derives, I suggest, from our opacity. We are opaque to one another. We can’t read 
minds, at least in any detail. How then can we know the other? How can we act for the other? Or 
how can the other act for me? 
The sharing in heaven appears to be participatory sharing. Mavrodes mentions the 
making of things in heaven. Perhaps, indeed, the making itself is always participatory so that one 
doesn’t first taste and see but rather in the making we all taste and see without any priority. The 
point of a painting is its beauty, not its being owned or even experienced by a specific person. In 
our earthly mode, someone might want to own a painting. Insofar as the owning is rooted in a 
self-interested desire to view the painting with convenience, let’s say, or a selfish desire to keep 
the beauty to oneself, such an owning is, we might say, unloving. Share-interest and participatory 
making/sharing go hand in hand, providing the support for the notion of solidarity proposed in 
the catechism. And all of this seems to move us toward the conclusion that the nature of the 
individual persons in heaven is quite different then the nature of individual persons on earth. As I 
put it earlier, love, in a paradoxical way, assumes that only the object of love, the person with 
whom the sharing occurs, is important. The loving self—the lover insofar as the lover has local 
self-interest—seems to drop out of the picture.  
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I’ve also argued that there is a distinction between local self-and generic self-interest. The 
former is rooted in the particular history any given human has lived (and hence leads one to act 
in the particular ways one does for one’s own ends) and the latter is rooted in general human 
needs (the fact that everyone is interested in her own well-being). Local self-interest is tied to my 
local history; it is my particularized self-interest that is tied to my individual identity. Insofar as 
loving another requires acting solely in the interest of another, truly loving another conflicts with 
both one’s local self-interest and individuality. Loving another with heavenly love requires 
extreme self-denial. Thus, insofar as my local self-interest cum local history makes me the 
individual I am, it is hard to see either why I would love another (it conflicts with my local self-
interest) or how to love another (it undermines my own individuality). Since my own self would 
be destroyed in the very act of becoming a totally loving person, the idea of loving my neighbor 
in this total way seems to be a demotivating factor. The only sort of solution to the motivation 
issue seems to be to show how one’s self-interest is the same as the interest of the other. To do 
that, however, undermines the notion of the individual altogether. How is my individuality still 
unique if it is merged or melded entirely with that of the other?   
Here solidarity might be introduced, but the notion of solidarity underlying the 
communion of the saints seems quite odd, suggesting that, in fact, everyone is one, organic 
entity—virtually one person. The focus would be entirely on share-interest and not anything to 
do directly with me. Yet Christian theology teaches that humans retain their own individuality it 
heaven. But insofar as they do, solidarity of the sort described by Paul (your suffering, joy, glory, 
etc. is identical to my suffering, joy, glory, etc.) seems impossible. Attempts such as those found 
in Brink to extend the self into the lives of others via influence on other people (with fission the 
26 
 
extreme case) don’t seem to work. Even in cases of fission, shortly after the person divides into 
“two,” the two take on local self-interest and we seem back to square one.  
In heaven, however, all individual needs are met. So perhaps what we are left with is 
share-interests; interest in beauty, for example, where the interest in the beautiful object is 
something that cannot truly be rooted in my own interest but is something that is by nature to be 
shared. We “taste and see” that something is good in order to pass the good around. This all 
touches on what we learned from Badwhar. What does it mean “to feel a sense of common 
humanity?” On the one hand, it could be a sort of strategic approach to the plight of others: let 
me think of myself as if I were the other person. On the other hand, feeling a common sense of 
humanity could be just that, a feeling. As such, it could be a motivator, but is one then acting on 
self-interest or other interest? We might say that one is acting in the interest of others (as a 
lawyer might for her client) but not that one is acting on their interests, interests that are identical 
to mine. Am I one with the rest of humanity or not? 
But more importantly, there appears to be a deep unclarity about the nature of self-
interest in Badhwar’s account.  Badhwar claims that it is a fundamental interest to shape the 
world according to one’s values, leaving the affirmation of one’s identity to one side.  But is the 
interest in shaping the world according to one’s values a local self-interest or share-interest? If 
such a fundamental desire is rooted in local self-interest then the peculiarities of my value-
structure seem to be forced upon others. If the desire is rooted in share-interest, then it is no 
longer clear what it has to do with individuals. Further, one’s identity does not, in virtue of being 
human, necessitate an altruistic identity. How does one ever become the sort of person whose 
focus is finally and totally on the other without losing one’s own individual identity? To do so 
27 
 
seems to require that one drop one’s local interest and become entirely share-interest oriented. 
But then we need not merely to act as if we are all the same but we need to be all the same. That 
is a metaphysical issue and not merely a psychological or emotional-affective concern. 
Perhaps there is something right, then, about Brink’s suggestions. Perhaps when one adds 
the claims about total transparency into the mix, psychological continuity would be enough to 
explain why acting in one’s own interest is also acting in the other’s interest. Is it possible that 
the fission case is what should have happened in the Garden of Eden, each new child being given 
the exact same goals/interests as the original human? As such, no one (given that no sin ever 
enters the world) ever develops an ego of one’s own. Sin messes up the permanent fission by not 
allowing us to always fission with the children but instead allowing us to divide into our own 
individual persons. As such, we missed God’s best for us.  
That works, perhaps, on the traditional Western model of the Garden where humans 
chose to become sinners from a state of grace. Closer is the Eastern model where humans where 
initially innocent as children are. But the evolutionary model suggests that with the development 
of freewill consciousness came the capacity to love. So perhaps we are moving toward the sort of 
fission where we all contribute to the general goodness of everyone. So a person remains an 
individual because she makes choices and lives in history but the choices are for others, for their 
good. Local self-interest continues on in a version in which each of us is a fissioned version of 
the goodness residing in us as we move more fully into the image of God. Instead of seeing our 
friends as versions of ourselves, we see ourselves as versions of our friends, friends who have 
become entirely trustworthy and other-centered. But in becoming other-centered, our friends 
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have found themselves tended to, doted over, cared for, and celebrated by us and their other 
friends. We individuals truly are “the other.” Our neighbors are us.  
When we explored Royce’s view on living two lives as one, we gleaned the distinction 
between vague and specific particulars as the object of our desires. But that doesn’t take us far 
enough either, for we are still left with the issues of solidarity. We still need an account of those 
vague particulars that allows for us all to desire and enjoy them without conflicts developing on 
the specific-particular level. The various particulars, on the model suggested here, have to do 
with the making of things. Since we humans make particular things when we do make them, 
there is no reason to think the after-life will be different in that regard. However, it may be that 
one’s making particulars will have a fundamental eye on making only things of beauty, 
goodness, and truth, features all will value fully and completely and not clamor for individually.  
Eckert raises the question about how we come to know our true selves. To do so, we must 
compare ourselves with God. The ability to do that, he indicates, is total self-denial. His focus on 
the beauty of God is telling, for we, he says, have no beauty of our own. When we deny 
ourselves, we come to realize that the beauty (in effect that we thought was ours) is really God’s 
beauty. The essence of the human person is total reliance not on self but on God. In knowing 
God via our own self-denial, we come to know both ourselves and everyone.  
One question to ask, however, is what “reliance on God” comes to. It is typical for us to 
think in terms of our own egos suppressing the urge to tend to our own needs in order to trust 
God. But Eckert seems to be saying something stronger, viz., that what we actually are, what our 
essence is, is reliance. That is, it is not just our choosing to trust but that our very nature is trust. 
What it is to be human is not to be a center of self-consciousness whose main feature is 
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awareness of our self-power but rather a center of self-consciousness aware of the fact—the 
metaphysical fact—that our power is not our own. There is, in short, no such thing as self-power. 
I am what another makes me—God is the fundamental reality and what I am is a finite, radically 
contingent being who exists only at the thought of God. If I am self-interested, it is automatically 
an interest in what God is interested in, for what I truly am is, in fact, what God makes.  
Two observations from Dostoevsky are important. One is that the voluntary act of 
suffering for someone else is an ultimate act of love. The other is that the slightest bit of ego-
fluffing will undo the structure that allows for love. Dostoevsky’s point is largely a 
psychological one, viz., that if we are to learn to love, we must learn to suffer for others, to deny 
ourselves. But the metaphysical point that lies behind the psychological one is what we are 
looking for in the kingdom setting. To give up one’s ego is difficult if not impossible this side of 
heaven. But once in heaven, one’s ego as we typically think of it, will cease to be. We will have 
done away with it because we will know our true selves, which is, according to Eckert, total 
reliance. I will be what God desires me to be and I will do it not by my power but God will do it 
by divine power. The power of humility is central to the Gospel and central, hence, to the 
kingdom. Humility has both an attitudinal aspect and an ontological aspect. The former is the 
psychological component of which Dostoevsky speaks, the latter the truth about ourselves. 
Compared to God, we are only contingent thoughts in God’s mind. Attitudinal humility brings us 
to the place where we can see our true ontological status. We are made by another. 
The attitude of humility, which includes the denial of one’s ego, is what is needed for the 
kingdom to come. The insight from the Gita that one can be detached from any personal 
consequence of one’s actions (focusing only on the consequences for the other) leads us to ask 
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what motivation there is in the first place for acting well toward one’s fellows. If I am out of the 
picture, why bother? In the Christian story, unlike the Hindu story (or at least this version of it), 
one’s own self is not lost in ultimate reality. Rather, my self continues. But it is not untouched. 
The true self, the one that underlies my daily ego, is not my own. I belong, so to speak, to 
another. That belonging is not a mere metaphor. What I am is totally dependent on God. Once I 
recognize that, I become what I was meant to be. I am an extension of God’s love and not a self-
sufficient entity. There is, so to speak, nothing to me but the sustaining love of another. 
One of the features of contemporary psychology is an emphasis on human maturity 
including the ability not to be overly reliant on others. One shouldn’t, for example, worry too 
much about how one appears to others or what others may think of you. Nor should we live our 
lives in “co-dependent” relationships. How are these contemporary notions of the self to be 
aligned with the biblical notions of becoming totally reliant on God and dying to one’s self? 
Contemporary psychology, of course, has great insights, but it is not the complete story. 
It is important to note, for example, that in spiritual direction one often comes across people who 
think so lowly of themselves that they let others and their opinions shape the directee’s life too 
much. Low self-esteem is something that one must first address in spiritual direction before the 
person can move into truly loving others. That is, love based on the neediness of one’s self is not 
true love. In an odd-sounding sort of way, in order to deny one’s self, there must be a self in the 
first place. In other words, one has to see one’s self more clearly in the first place to move to a 
second stage where one sees one’s self clearly enough to set one’s self-reliance aside. One 
cannot deny one’s self if one doesn’t’ believe there is a self to begin with. The fallen state is, in 
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some sense, dependent on good self-esteem. But then to overcome the fallen state, one must have 
even better self-esteem, trusting one’s self entirely to the other.  
Now typically we think of the other in this context as God. One must see, as Eckert notes, 
that what I truly am is not my own. I am, and any value I have is, due to God and God’s creative 
love. But what if, in the kingdom of heaven, other humans are also responsible for what I am? 
Here the body of Christ language is central, as are the insights noted by Dostoevsky. Jesus is one 
person who takes on the responsibility for all humanity. The pain and suffering Christ endured is 
our pain and suffering. If we are to become Christ-like, we must take on responsibility for all. 
Indeed, the truth is we are responsible for all. But just as much as we are responsible for all, just 
as much as my suffering is, indeed, the suffering of others, so are the goods of others my goods. 
True love requires that the suffering and the goods of each of us are, indeed, the same suffering 
and goods others experience.  
Here the fact that love and altruism are not the same is central. Love is more complicated 
than altruism. One can do an altruistic act for a total stranger. Love, however, seems to require 
more than merely acting well toward another, even at expense of oneself. To truly love someone 
requires knowledge of the person loved. How much knowledge? That is the problem of knowing 
the will (and thoughts) of the other, something we typically don’t have access to. To gain such 
access, we need total transparency.  
Paul speaks of knowing fully as I am known when he refers to the kingdom of love. Here 
we need to explore the role of transparency. Of course transparent people are not like opaque 
people. To be totally known (like we know hydrogen atoms) would reshape us completely. But 
that is exactly the point of the Kingdom. I propose that being transparent as humans is not like 
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the transparency of a hydrogen atom but something more. It is, indeed, the foundation of love as 
it is found first in God and then in us. 
